核心提示：印度国防研究与发展组织DRDO没去建科学中心，却花经费大力兴建世界级的大礼堂、会议中心和酒店；DRDO在试验室里种蘑菇和兰花，还投入大量精力来杂交黄瓜、西红柿和辣椒，为生产出世界上最辣的辣椒而沾沾自喜。

环球时报?环球网1月24日报道 《印度防务观察》编辑Bharat Verma2008年1月15日在印度最大的门户网站Rediff上发表“国防研究与发展组织是怎样废掉印度军力”的文章，揭露了印度国防研究与发展组织在国产武器研发中的种种弊端和恶习，表达了对其深深的失望之情，并提出了发展印度国防工业的新想法。

文章称，印度和巴基斯坦都在发展各自的导弹计划，由于印度国防研究与发展组织总是要求所有复杂的武器都要自己研制，而巴基斯坦在中国的帮助下在想尽一切手段，结果是务实的巴基斯坦取得了成功，而自大的印度却遭到了失败。

印度“导弹发展综合计划”(IGMDP)搁浅其实并不意外，这次失败在印度国防研究与发展组
织(DRDO)——印度最高级别的国防研发机构——不光彩的记录上又增加了一笔。在近25年的时间内，印度军队向DRDO提出的急需的现代化武器计划最终都没有实现，只换来了空头支票。

印度军队在面临战略平衡向对手倾斜的危险时，被逼无奈只能向外疯狂的求购武器。除了导
弹，其他像“阿琼”主战坦克，“尼尚特” (Nishant)无人机，LCA“光辉”战斗机，
INSAS突击步枪，也都是在试验中表现不佳，但最终印度军队还得忍受这些缺陷被迫接收。

在不断扯皮中，军队失去了25年的宝贵时间，印度的纳税人为“导弹发展综合计划”浪费了200亿卢比，而这个计划仍在苟延残喘以继续遮掩DRDO的无能。

在“导弹发展综合计划”展开后不久，就有很多声音指出完成如此高精尖的计划是一定需要外国帮助的；可DRDO为了独占预算而固执的坚持自主开发，以至于这个计划久拖未决。

DRDO这么多年来就是在做重复无意义的无用功——总是想将所有的系统和分系统的研发自己完全走一遍，结果就是至今几乎一无所获。

印度在上世纪70年代仿制一种俄制导弹失败后，“导弹发展综合计划”在A P J Abdul
Kalam博士的领导下(后来的印度总统)于1983年启动。但是25年后，计划中的导弹型号都没
能如期研制完成。“大地”地地弹道导弹现在依然存在发射准备方面的问题，在问题解决之前印度陆军不会信任这种近程战术导弹；“特里苏尔”(Trishul)近程防空导弹在引进外国
技术前就是一根棒槌，最终印度空军还是采用了以色列的Spyder防空导弹，它的海军型号只能由以色列的“巴拉克”舰载防空导弹来顶替；射程27公里的“阿卡什”(Akash)中程防空
导弹在2007年底才开始试射；而射程为4到7公里的反坦克导弹还没有交付用户试验。

DRDO研发的拖沓使得印度空军现在还在使用SA-3和SA-8防空导弹，导致印度空军在面对西方面的防空漏洞时无能为力。

射程分别为700公里2500公里的烈火I和烈火II导弹已经试射了五次，但它们作为一种可携带核弹头的导弹都还不够可靠。印度陆军和空军分别拥有8枚和24枚这种导弹，在这些导弹的
质量还都不值得信赖的时候，射程6000公里的烈火IV导弹却已经开始准备研制了。

缺乏监督，国防研究经费竟然拿去研究杂交蔬菜

一个私下的共识是：DRDO的无能不止表现在导弹计划上；它所进行的所有计划都需要进行重新审视。DRDO在科研上的失败之处首先在于它缺乏监督和无目的性。

DRDO的首脑身兼三职。他除了DRDO的领导职位外，还占着国防研发局长和国防部长科学顾问的位子。一个人身兼三个相互关联的职位使得最基本的问责制度都不复存在，他根本不需要向任何人负责。

1997年，在印度即将成功进口一种炮兵定位雷达的时候，DRDO许诺将在两年内研制出国产化型号，结果这项交易被取消。由于研制计划不顺利，没有新型炮兵雷达的印度军队因为无法定位对方的炮兵阵地，在与巴基斯坦的边境冲突中遭受了重大的伤亡。印度国产雷达研制果然没有如期完成，印度只得在2003年再回头进口以前的那种雷达。在作者看来，DRDO应该为这些重大伤亡负直接责任。

DRDO没去建科学中心，却花经费大力兴建世界级的大礼堂、会议中心和酒店；DRDO在试验室里种蘑菇和兰花，还投入大量精力来杂交黄瓜、西红柿和辣椒，为生产出世界上最辣的辣椒
而沾沾自喜。DRDO还用国防经费研究安哥拉新品种兔子和什么茶叶！作者认为DRDO沉浸在这些与本职无关的事情，不但分散了精力，甚至已经忘记了自己的本分。

国防研究与发展组织(DRDO)已恶疾在身 必须与西方军火巨头合资才是印度国防工业的出路

作者认为，为了清除DRDO的恶疾，印度政府应该立刻将印度转变为一个以生产部门为主的低投入高产出的世界研发中心。印度的人口条件和地缘政治的优势对于世界上任何一个投资者来说都是有吸引力的。在保持自己的科技领先地位的同时，西方将会发现印度是一个投资国防工业的合适地点，印度不但是一个潜在的巨大军火市场，还将是一个研发高性价比项目的基地。

另外，作者还认为印度应该放弃走所有研制过程老路的想法，应该成为全球的武器生产工厂。像波音、洛?马、空客等世界上最强大的军火生产公司都无力单独承担所有研制工作，现
在是全球联合研制武器的时代了，欧洲战斗机和欧洲直升机正是这种合作的典范，印度的俄制苏-30MKI战斗机如果没有法国和以色列的参与，也不会有现在的这种战斗力。

除了和外国大公司联合，印度也应该向塔塔这种印度私有公司敞开市场，并让印度公司和外国军火军头在印度组成合资公司，这样既可以引进外国专家和企业管理高层，还会在最短的时间内缩短与西方的差距，实现印度军队武器的现代化。

作者最后说，印度花费了58年的时间才勉强认识到军事外交在国际事物中的作用，如果
DRDO能认识到技术先进、蓬勃发展的国防技术对印度的国家安全和全球目标有着同等重要的
作用的话，印度就不会现在这个样子了。所以他催促印度政府一定要加强对DRDO的监督，将DRDO的精力和资源全部投入到研制工作上来，同时还要与国内外的私有企业展开卓有成效的合作，而不是把它们排斥在国防研制计划之外。

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The difference between India's failure against Pakistan's success in their respective missile programmes is based on the purist mindset of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop indigenously all complex weapon platforms and Islamabad's intelligent alliance with China and the approach to achieve its goals 'by any means, fair or foul'! While Pakistan was pragmatic in its approach, India was merely pompous.

Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme has been finally shelved. This marks an unceremonious end of an ambitious technological misadventure by the DRDO -- country's premier defence R&D agency. For nearly two-and-a-half decades, it doled out mere promises to the country's armed forces -- delaying their much- needed modernisation plans.

The armed forces were forced to resort to off-the-shelf 'panic buying' whenever they realised that the strategic balance was tilting in favour of their adversaries. Besides missiles, there are other equipments such as the Main Battle Tank Arjun, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Nishant, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, INSAS rifles which have been thrust on the end users despite unsatisfactory performances during trials.

In the bargain, the military lost 25 precious years and the taxpayers' nearly Rs 2,000 crore by keeping the IGMDP programme under wraps to hide its inefficiency from the nation.

Even when the IGMDP was embarked upon, many pointed out that to successfully complete such a high-end technological programme, foreign collaboration would be needed. But the DRDO's obduracy prevailed and the programme dragged for so many years.

It is wasteful to try and 'reinvent the wheel', but that is precisely what the DRDO backed by New Delhi did for all these years -- trying to develop every system and sub-system indigenously and ending up developing practically nothing of substance.

The IGMPD started in 1983 after India failed to reverse engineer a Russian missile in the seventies, with A P J Abdul Kalam as the head. However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.

Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.

AGNI ?I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.

The tacit admission of the DRDO's inability must not be limited to the missile programme alone; a review of all projects under its aegis is needed for a reality check and course correction. The DRDO fault-line primarily is a result of lack of accountability, focus, and failure to develop scientific disposition.

The director general of DRDO wears three hats. He is also, secretary defence R&D and scientific advisor to the defence minister. These three inter-linked hats on one individual destroy the basic principal of accountability. Therefore, he is not answerable to anyone.

DRDO scuttled a contract that was on the verge of being signed by India in 1997 for the import of a Weapon Locating Radar as the latter promised to produce it indigenously within two years. Due to this negligence, the Indian Army could not neutralise Pakistan's artillery fire effectively in the Kargil conflict and suffered heavy causalities. Of course, the DRDO to date is not in a position to produce WLR and ultimately India bought it from the previously selected producer in 2003. In my view, DRDO should be held directly responsible for these unwarranted war causalities.

The DRDO actually produces in its Tezpur laboratory orchids and mushrooms, identifies the sharpest chili in the world with pride, while its lab in Pithoragarh develops hybrid varieties of cucumber, tomato and capsicum. It spends merrily from the defence budget on developing new strains of Angora rabbits and 'Namkeen Herbal Tea'! DRDO by indulging in such irrelevant activities lost its focus and sight of its primary responsibility.

Instead of building a scientific temper, DRDO from its inception indulged in empire building, spending a major part of its budget on world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls, and hostels, while neglecting research work.

To remove DRDO's fault-line, New Delhi should rapidly transform India into a low cost, high end R&D centre of the world without neglecting its manufacturing sector. Fairly ideal demographic conditions exist along with favourable geo-political factors whereby international actors are willing to invest, as well as, set up shop in India. To maintain their technological lead, the West finds India as a logical destination for their defence industries, both as a potential market and also a base to develop low cost high-end research projects.

On the other hand, we need to leapfrog as well as piggyback technologically, as reinventing the wheel is not necessarily an answer to the yawning technological gap that exists between the western countries and India. Therefore, there are synergies that should be exploited. Enormous mutual benefits can occur to both, if New Delhi can develop itself as a world-class R&D centre and a global hub for manufacturing sensitive military equipment.

Due to the rapid march of technologies and huge costs involved in R&D, no single player is in a position to deliver next generation weapon systems. Whether it is Boeing, Lockheed Martin, DCN, Airbus, or HDW -- all of them sub-contract different assemblies and sub-systems globally to the most competitive and competent companies. The other interesting trend is the formation of trans-national consortiums of nations and companies to manufacture superior platforms like the Euro fighter or the Euro copter. The game, thus, is global as it is not feasible for a single player to manufacture or develop each item.

In the development Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the major player was the Russian corporation IRKUT but without the help of France [Images] and Israel, the fighter aircraft could not have developed the decisive technological edge that it displays. Therefore, India needs to shed its inhibitions, diversify, and form international industrial alliances to leapfrog technological gaps, boost export revenues from its military industrial complex, and leverage this strength as a strategic asset in Asia.

In any case, defence technologies become obsolete by the time a country can reinvent the wheel. Therefore, radical shifting of strategic gears to a more advantageous position by opening up the field to private sector will stimulate self-sufficiency. Companies like Tatas or L&T can enter into joint ventures and where necessary import CEO's and employ foreign scientists to kick start complex projects.

In fact, to improve performance of the Public Sector Units there should be competitors making fighter aircraft, missiles, and warships in the corporate world. Such farsighted policy shifts will improve India's self?sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. This in turn, will increase the stakes of multi-nationals in India's well being and marginalise sanction regimes.

The Indian Foreign Office took 58 years to grudgingly acknowledge the criticality of military diplomacy in international affairs. If DRDO can appreciate that a technologically advanced and vibrant defence industry is equally critical for India's security and its global aspirations, we will not replicate this mistake. In other words, it should be made to realise that it solely exists to support the armed forces and not vice versa. Therefore, New Delhi should force ruthless accountability, create focus and development of scientific temperament within DRDO and ensure fruitful collaboration with the Indian and international private sector, instead of permitting them to fritter away the defence budget on irrelevant and peripheral activities.